Adolf to Azov

While Operation Ruppert had to be done to such secrecy, the OSS rarely received any information about Vinogradov, if ever. It wouldn’t be until April of 1945, when Vinogradov made contact again with the Allies, who have helped in this spy mission. However, upon his return he would bring back very important information.

During his time in Berlin, he worked with many high-ranking Nazis. One of his tasks was even working for one of the assistants to Alfred Rosenberg, Gerhard von Mende. Gerhard von Mende

Vinogradov, along with Kedia and his men, drew up a plan to escape, to the west once. Vinogradov collected as much information as he possibly could about enemy partisans’ networks, while at the same time Kedia, was organizing an Exodus for him and his fellow Georgians, to Switzerland.

Upon escaping across the lines Vinogradov was discovered near Eisenach by the Americans. Vinogradov also brought with him the intelligences documenting information on the Nazis eastern European Partisan network. Once the Americans the Americans knew he was an intel asset, they sent him directly to Paris, for a debriefing.

He mentioned how he was able to work with Gerhard von Mende and was able to learn much about how Alfred Rosenberg was able to set up his network of eastern European. Vinogradov also mentioned how Mende was able to help many of his fellow partisan contacts escape to Switzerland. This numbered close to a hundred men, who came from both German as well as non-Germanic backgrounds.

Vinogradov mentioned that the partisan was hoping to contact an American representative in an effort to secure a peace deal. Vinogradov was determined to save many people who worked for German SD, SS, and Wehrmacht, on the terms that they had mutual problem of penetrating Georgia and Russia. While these sources remained unnamed for their safety, Vinogradov was still focused on negotiating with the allies for help for them. Lt. Albert E. Jolis, agreed to secretly contact the escaped party. Jolis didn’t know what to make of the partisan group, since they didn’t know much about Kedia and his men. The original point of the initial contact was to determine what intelligence potential they represented.

Jolis plan was to talk with Kedia and find out what information he could give us immediately on the SD and the post-hostilities clandestine movement, while also informing him that he would be treated fairly by the allies, just like the other eastern European and Germans who have fled the Soviets, and don’t want to return. He also needed to find out the names of the of the 100 men who he wanted protection for including information such as pseudonyms, jobs, and physical descriptions, if possible. After the information was verified and the émigrés would be given a password and directions that he could share with his other partisans, on how to contact people in OSS field detachments, for help. He also made sure to have the men be informed about the fair treatment of displaced people.

Both Jolis and Vinogradov, were able to sneak into Switzerland and link up with Kedia. What the Lieutenant saw displeased him. Filing his report in May, Jolis wrote his review of Kedia in which he stated:

He was not a suitable person to be used for current intelligence objectives. His fanatical anti-communism, which amounted to a strong desire to see an early war between Russia and the US as a means of realizing the independence of the Caucasus, and the fact that basically he is a political activist and revolutionary, rendered it essential for security reasons that no commitments be made to him, and that contact be held to a minimum.

They only agreed to keep Kedia in their contacts, only in the case to use him as a source of information, should the nazis revitalize their movement. Even though his first review didn’t go well, Kedia negative reputation would change better, a German lawyer and Abwehr officer, named Eduard Waetjen, who was working for a spy mentioned his name, while spying on the Kreisau Circle, mention Kedia with great honor, in May, of 1945. To the allies it was unknown how trust Kedia really was worth. Because of this he never became a working asset for the Americans, like he wanted. Rather he was left to live in Munich, during this time he and his network were studied by the allies for a few years after the war. The Allies main focus was to obtain as much information about the partisan network that Kedia was running; in order to reactivate this network to full operational capacity, should America go to war with the Soviets. Many of Kedia contact were viewed as potential diplomatic friends for America, and were given employment through the American Intel Agencies, should America ever need their support. Kedia was not lucky enough to fall into this category.

The future of the men that Kedia tried to save was nothing but destitue. Many of the émigré living in Switzerland, were unable to find work. Many of them had problems and became targets for the Swiss authorities. During this time, out of one hundred emigres, only one was found suitable enough to work with the Allies and was able to get a job in Parris. The swiss were getting tired of taking care of these emigres, and even pondered setting up a type of camp to concentrate the group in. With this growing threat Kedia became more and more nervous. As Kedia started acting more anxious, the more the American were skeptical of him. Some even viewed him as being a spy, because of his desperate acts. Even the Swiss Intelligence commented on his behavior, stating that Kedia was still in contact with many White Russians, and that any of these White Russian could be a Soviet spy without Kedia knowing.

In 1946 America became more interested in Kedia’s network, as a possible war with the Soviets loomed, and they wanted full control of Kadia’s network, for itself. Their focus was on making sure that the partisan networks the Kedia were running weren’t going to fall into the hands of either the Germans again or the white Russian. Kedia would then vanish suddenly, never to be heard from again, a few years after the war. America still kept in very close contact with Kedia’s fellow partisan movements, slowly building them up over time. These same networks or partisan were also told to report an activity of the Soviets involving them. It was also feared that the Soviets might use these same partisan groups for their own cause as well.